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Introduction: Medicine shortages result in great risk for the continuity of patient care
especially for antimicrobial treatment, potentially enhancing resistance rates and having
a higher economic impact. This study aims to identify, describe, assess, and assign risk
priority levels to potential failures following substitution of antimicrobial treatment due to
shortages among European hospitals. Furthermore, the study investigated the impact
of corrective actions on risk reduction so as to provide guidance and improve future
patient care.
Methods: Health-care failure mode and effect analysis (HFMEA) was applied to
hospitals in Austria (H-AT), Belgium (H-BE), Croatia (H-CR), Greece (H-GR), Spain (H-SP),
and Serbia (H-SR). Multidisciplinary teams identified processes, failure modes, causes,
and corrective actions related to antibiotic substitution following medicine shortages.
Characteristics of study hospitals as well as severity, probability, and hazard scores (HSs)
of failure modes/causes were analyzed using Microsoft Office Excel 2010 and IBM SPSS
Statistics® via descriptive and inferential statistics.
Results: Through HFMEA, 74 failure modes were identified, with 53 of these scoring 8
or above on the basis of assigned severity and probability for a failure. Severity of failure
modes differed before and after corrective actions in H-CR, H-GR, and H-SR (p< 0.005).
Their probability differed in all study hospitals (p< 0.005) when compared before and after
corrective actions aimed to be implemented. The highest number of failure-mode causes
was detected in H-CR (46) and the lowest in H-SP (16). Corrective actions can address
failure modes and lower HSs; therein, all teams proposed the following: structuring
communication among stakeholders, introducing electronic prescribing, strengthening
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pharmacists’ involvement, and increasing effectiveness of the ward stock assessment.
These proposed actions led to HS reductions up to 83%.
Conclusion: There is a lack of structure in addressing risks associated with antibiotic
substitution following shortages. Furthermore, lack of communication, data scarcity on
availability of antibiotics, non-supportive information technology (IT) systems, and lack of
internal substitution protocols hinder quick assessment of alternatives addressing patient
needs. Nevertheless, the study shows that health-care professionals manage to secure
optimal antimicrobial treatment for patients using available IT and human resources.
Keywords: medicine shortage, prospective risk assessment, failure modes, Europe, hospitals
INTRODUCTION
Medicine shortages are an everyday occurrence, causing great
risk to the continuity of patient care (1, 2). Following medicine
shortages, providing a suitable, clinically appropriate and
safe alternative medicine to a patient is a priority to every
health-care professional (3, 4). However, many risks may
occur when substituting medicines including reducing the
treatment effectiveness and threatening patient safety (5).
These risks include, among others, incorrectly comparing
the alternative medicine’s administration patterns to the
initial treatment, miscommunicating them to health-care
professionals, and underestimating the potential for new
drug–drug interactions (5).
A survey conducted by the ISMP revealed that medicine
shortages pose a challenge to health-care professionals to
provide safe medication treatment and avoid life-threatening
medication errors, compromising the health-care process and
affecting patient safety (5). The World Health Organization
(WHO) Medication Without Harm initiative considers that
the aforementioned errors and malpractice could be avoided
through ensuring safer processes encompassing the prescription
of the medicine, as well as its dispensing, preparation, and
administration (6).
According to surveys from the European Association of
Hospital Pharmacists (EAHP) and the American Society of
Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP), antibiotics appear to be
in the group of medicines most impacted by shortages (2,
7). Bearing in mind the complexity of choosing the right
antimicrobial treatment in light of the looming threat of bacterial
resistance (8) as has also been reported by the WHO Global
report and a lack of development of new antibiotics, shortages
bring even more risk to the management of antibiotic use (9–13).
Significant challenges can be foreseen when considering potential
consequences of the antimicrobial shortages including optimal
treatment delay and an increase of unjustified use of broad-
spectrum antimicrobials. This may lead to substandard therapy,
resulting in inferior health outcomes and treatment efficacy and
increased toxicity (10, 14).
A study conducted among health-care professionals on the
perception of antimicrobial shortages in the USA found that
more than 50% of professionals believe these shortages lead to
the use of expensive antibiotics with lower effectiveness and
safety (15). In addition, health-care professionals may not be
aware of the substitute’s administration and dosing patterns,
possibly leading to errors in application and unexpected adverse
events (16). Another problem when substituting antibiotics is
the time gap between the moment of awareness of a shortage
and the moment that the alternative is made available (17).
Owing to the urgent nature of cases presented, a higher incidence
of medication errors when a shortage occurs in emergency
departments (ERs) limits the time available to account for
all aspects of a substitute’s application patterns. Moreover,
insufficient time to relocate substitutes stored in hospital
pharmacies to the ER may bear potential fatal consequences
(18, 19).
In the USA, the rate of shortages of antibiotics increased
from 2001 to 2013, totaling 148 antibiotic shortages being
reported, including a shortage in piperacillin/tazobactam of 1,900
days (20). In Europe, the EAHP Survey on medicine shortages
revealed an increase of reported antimicrobial shortages among
hospital pharmacists from 57 to 77%, between 2014 and 2018
(2). Such increased antimicrobial shortages may be a factor
affecting efforts undertaken by health authorities and health-
care professionals to enhance the rational use of antimicrobials
across health-care settings when taking into account their share
in overall medicine consumption, including the use of generics
(21–26).
The need to evaluate risks emerging from medicine
substitution has been recognized by European, Canadian, US,
and Australian health authorities (4, 27–29). This demonstrates
the importance of having a risk assessment in place to prevent
risks emerging from medicine substitution due to shortages.
Whereas, reactive and retrospective hazard analyses such as
incident reporting (IC) or root cause analysis (RCA) are focused
on the event that took place in the past, proactive and prospective
risk assessments such as failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
are based on anticipating risks/hazards and proposing mitigation
pathways (30). Initially developed for in the aerospace sector, the
FMEA was first implemented in the 1960s. In 2002, the Veterans
Affairs National Center for Patient Safety (VA NCPS) developed
a modified health-care FMEA (HFMEA) version, applicable in
health-care settings (30).
Several studies have recognized the importance that HFMEA
has when it comes to identifying failure modes (FMs), its causes
and consequences in a variety of health-care processes, such
as distribution and the administration of medicines, parenteral
nutrition, and chemotherapy (31–39). As recently demonstrated
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in a study by Castro Vida et al. (40), the HFMEA has
been conducted in all processes and sub-processes in hospital
pharmacies except for medicine-shortage management (40).
Consequently, we sought to address this. The aim of this study
was to identify, describe, assess, and assign risk priority levels
to potential failures occurring during antimicrobial treatment
substitution processes in patients following shortages within
health-care settings across Europe. Furthermore, the study aimed
to evaluate the potential impact of proposed actions on risk
reduction. This study falls under the research conducted by the
wider European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST)
Action 15105-Medicines Shortages Research Network.
METHODS
Recruitment of Hospitals
HFMEA as developed by the US Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) was applied to six European hospitals (30, 41). Hospitals
were recruited via the COST Action 15105 and the EAHP
networks. The HFMEA was conducted between March 2018 and
April 2019 in the following hospitals: the Institute of Orthopedic
Surgery “Banjica” in Belgrade, Serbia (H-SR); followed by the
General Hospital “George Papanikolaou” in Thessaloniki, Greece
(H-GR); the Infanta Sofia Hospital in Madrid, Spain (H-SP);
the Vienna General Hospital in Vienna, Austria (H-AT); the
General Hospital “Tomislav Bardek” in Koprivnica, Croatia (H-
CR); and the University Hospital Leuven in Leuven, Belgium (H-
BE). No ethical approval, neither written informed consent were
sought for this study as the information obtained was practice-
base oriented. In addition, the healthcare professionals freely
participated and no patients were involved.
Health-Care Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis Conduct
The HFMEA was applied within each hospital as a prospective
risk assessment tool aimed at detecting, evaluating, and ranking
FMs/risks/hazards related to antibiotic substitution caused by
a medicine shortage. A multidisciplinary team was created in
each hospital prior to the initialization of the research. During
the conduct of this study, the teams undertook an HFMEA of
antibiotic substitution stemming from medicine shortages. The
HFMEA team consisted of a physician, a pharmacist, a pharmacy
technician, a nurse, and a person responsible for health care
quality in the hospital. One member of the research team (NM;
lead) was present in each hospital throughout the duration of the
analysis. A dedicated member of the multidisciplinary team of
each hospital (co-lead) helped in organizing study meetings. The
data on the HFMEA were gathered by the lead and co-leads.
During the HFMEA, each team had to reach a consensus
on the processes and sub-processes of antibiotic substitution. In
addition, a hazard analysis was carried out, where FMs (possible
errors) and FM causes (FMCs) were identified and scored on
their severity and probability. Scores were established following
a consensus procedure. According to the VA guidelines, severity
was graded as catastrophic = 4, major = 3, moderate = 2, or
minor = 1. Probability was scored as frequent = 4, occasional =
3, uncommon= 2, or remote= 1 (30, 41). By multiplying scores
for probability and severity, a hazard score (HS) of a maximum
of 16 (4 × 4) was assigned to each FM/cause. Consensus scoring
prevented variability of scoring within teams as cases of differing
points of view were resolved through discussion.
In the final stage, team members proposed corrective actions
aiming at controlling, eliminating, or accepting detected FMCs
via decision tree analysis. Corrective actions were subsequently
implemented and assessed for their effectiveness through
rescoring FM in all sub-processes. Depending on the HFMEA
decision tree, a hazard score of 8 was considered to be a threshold:
>8 were subject to further analysis and <8 were not analyzed.
However, if the HS represented FMs corresponding to critical
points in substituting anti-microbial treatment due to shortages
(where there are no measures noted to control the hazard), the
FM was further analyzed regardless of the score (30, 41).
Analysis of Results
Information on FMs, causes, and scores was recorded
in prepared paper-based templates and subsequently
transferred into electronic format. The analysis followed a
mixed qualitative/quantitative design, where equal attention
was given to the description of processes/sub-processes
and FMs/causes/effects, as well as comparison of scores.
Characteristics of study hospitals and hazard analysis, as well
as severity, probability, and HSs of FMs/causes were analyzed
using Microsoft Office Excel 2010 and IBM SPSS Statistics R© via
descriptive and inferential statistics. The difference in HSs before
and after corrective actions within and between hospitals was
tested using Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the Kruskal–Wallis
test, respectively. The statistical significance level chosen for this
study was 0.05.
RESULTS
Hospital Characteristics
The hospitals included in this study represented a broad
spectrum of large (H-AT and H-BE) and smaller hospitals
(H-CR, H-GR, H-SP, and H-SR) in number of hospital beds,
physicians, hospital pharmacists, and pharmacy technicians
(Table 1). Although all study hospitals had Drug and
Therapeutics Committees (DTCs) in place and almost all
hospitals had dedicated pharmacists in charge of medicine
shortages, only H-SP had a dedicated medicine shortages
task force group. No hospital had internal written guidelines
or mitigation pathways in place to facilitate management
of shortages. All hospitals, except for H-SP, opted for six
sub-processes describing antibiotic substitution in shortages
(Figure 1).
Antibiotic Replacement Sub-processes per
Hospital
All hospitals, apart from H-GR, commenced the antibiotic
replacement process with the assessment of the availability of
alternatives (Figure 1). In H-AT and H-BE, this assessment is
informed by their respective official national shortage websites.
In H-SP, the availability of alternatives before feeding it
within the internal hospital IT system is assessed via multiple
sources including databases and manufacturers/wholesalers. H-
AT confirms the availability of retrieved alternatives through
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics of study hospitals.
Characteristics Hospitals
H-AT H-BE H-CR H-GR H-SP H-SR
Number of hospital beds 1,773 1,995 350 650 271 550
Number of physicians 1,582 1,686 149 556 368 130
Number of hospital pharmacists 33 32 3 5 8 3
Number of pharmacy technicians 64 52 5 3 14 2
Type of hospital Tertiary care
university
hospital
Tertiary care
university
hospital
General
university
hospital
General
university
hospital
Tertiary care
university
hospital
Tertiary care
university
specialized
hospital
Existing Drug and Therapeutics Committee (DTC) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Existing medicine shortages task force group No No No No Yes No
Existing internal guidelines on medicine shortages mitigation pathways/strategies No Under
development
No No No No
Dedicated pharmacists in charge of medicine shortages Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
FIGURE 1 | Color-coded flowchart highlighting similar patterns in sub-processes across health-care failure mode and effect analysis (HFMEA) study hospitals.
oral and written communication with pharmaceutical companies
and wholesalers. Health-care professionals in H-CR and
H-SR focus on the antibiotic spectrum of activity when
discussing possible alternative treatments. H-GR only checks
availability in the third step after selecting alternatives on the
basis of the patient profile, patients’ clinical status, and the
antibiotic spectrum.
After availability was checked, H-SR, H-SP, H-AT, H-CR, and
H-BE validate patient records and the selection of the alternative
with a multidisciplinary team. Health-care professionals in
H-CR and H-SR compare dosage requirements, as well as
reconstitution patterns, and stability issues of the alternative
antibiotic treatment vs. the initial treatment as part of their
decision making. In H-BE, data on all aspects of the antibiotic
substitution are discussed within the hospital’s DTC. In H-AT,
the same manner of assessment is carried out via written/oral
communication in relation to the complexity of the clinical
situation in order to reach a conclusion, which can be further
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FIGURE 2 | Major failure mode causes related to key sub-processes in antibiotic substitution.
shared with all health-care professionals. In both H-AT and H-
BE, these methods of communication are necessary prior to
establishing a recommendation on an antibiotic substitute, which
is then uploaded into the hospital’s IT system. In H-AT and H-
SP, a recommendation on the agreed substitute is subsequently
communicated to all health-care professionals. In H-CR and H-
SR, this transfer of data is provided only after an alternative
antimicrobial adverse event profile and patient allergies are both
assessed separately. Apart from health-care professionals, the
information on the alternative is also provided to patients in H-
CR. The need for additional patient monitoring after switching is
taken into consideration in H-SR, H-SP, H-CR, and H-BE.
Failure Modes and Failure Mode Causes
per Antibiotic Replacement Sub-process
The flowcharts (Figure 1) present the processes and sub-
processes that theHFMEA teams identified in a series ofmeetings
to discuss antibiotic replacement. Throughout these meetings,
the teams assigned FM (i.e., potential hazards) and FMC (i.e.,
potential hazard causes) to each sub-process. The teams, by
consensus, assigned FM and FMC severity and probability scores
and further assessed FM and FMC via decision tree analysis
(30, 41).
Accessing Data on Alternatives
The availability of alternative antibiotics is checked in H-
AT and H-BE through dedicated national or health-care
professional organizations websites and/or by direct contact
with the wholesalers and company representatives in H-AT, H-
CR, H-SP, and H-SR. FM linked to this sub-process, identified
across hospitals, was a “lack of synchronization between data
on alternatives availability and hospital dispensing/ordering
systems.” Teams indicated that this “lack of synchronization”
could be caused by “lack of time,” “failing internet connections,”
“incompetence to quickly retrieve needed information,” or
“getting non-accurate, non-timely or wrong/miscommunicated
information” owing to manufacturers or wholesalers not being
willing to disclose availability data (Figure 2).
Check Appropriateness of Alternatives Within
Multidisciplinary Teams
When provided with data on potential available alternatives,
in H-AT and H-BE, there is a structured process of sharing
the data on potential antibiotic substitutes with physicians and
other health-care professionals involved in mitigating medicine
shortages through scheduled DTC meetings or via calls/emails,
depending on the patient clinical status. However, in H-AT,
approval of the substitute may not be accomplished as for
“miscommunication between a hospital pharmacist and other
health-care professionals” or “lack of time.” Because the risk
assessment is incomplete of medicines that may be unavailable,
a specific treatment regimen in H-BE for one or more groups
of patients may not necessarily be taken into consideration
when choosing an alternative. As mentioned by teams of H-
CR and H-GR, health-care professionals involved in approving
the alternative are not always available, and a substitute’s
dosage requirements are sometimes not well-interpreted. In
H-GR, a “lack of clarity and ease to implement internal
procedures/guidelines for assessment of alternatives” hinders the
interpretation of them. Analysis in H-SP showed that health-
care professionals’ substitution assessment can fail if performed
by “less experienced health-care professionals” (while senior staff
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are not present), “not being included into everyday practice,”
or due to a “lack of time.” When it comes to agreeing on the
substitute, in H-SR, comparing alternative’s effectiveness with
that of the initial treatment can be hampered by “lack of access to
data”; alternatively, “not prioritizing the comparison of treatment
effectiveness” (Figure 2).
Validate Patient Records With Regard to Alternative
Introduced
In all HFMEA study hospitals, hospital pharmacists performed
various activities within the sub-processes related to reviewing
patient medical records and clinical status. This included
assessing the potential for patient allergies, alternative’s onset of
activity, and emerging drug–drug interactions. FMs recurring
here are drawn by causes such as the “lack of time,” “high
workload” with “task interruption,” and “data dependency” in H-
AT and H-BE. The “lack of experience and knowledge on how
to efficiently assess data” and the “limited access to electronic
data” are additional causes in H-SR, H-GR, and H-CR. In H-SP,
previously mentioned FMs seem to be mostly caused by “senior
staff routine practice not incorporating a quick change in therapy
due to shortages” together with “junior staff not being aware of
ongoing situations.”
Transfer the Information on Alternatives to
Health-Care Professionals Involved in Treatment
After data on alternative antibiotic treatment are processed,
along with patient record validation, this information is
transferred into hospitals ordering/dispensing IT systems and
disseminated to health-care professionals. Nevertheless, data
transfer is sometimes delayed or not conducted properly. This
is due to causes such as “high workload” connected with
“task interruption” and “miscommunication or information
overload” as in H-AT. Sometimes, a frequent change in
alternatives availability makes it difficult to sustain a “proper
data flow” as mentioned in H-BE, which is also followed
by absence of obligatory ward stock replenishments on a
daily basis. Moreover, a nurse in H-BE might not understand
the way data are presented or does not pay attention to a
message transferred. In H-CR and H-SR, apart from a “lack
of time,” a “lack of means of communication” may delay
antibiotic alternative data transfer. For H-GR, FMs are related
to transferring information occur within the last phase of
antibiotic substitution and are caused by “inter-professional and
interpersonal misunderstanding” and “absence of quality systems
that define communication pathways.” In H-SP, another FM was
that health-care professionals that are not directly involved in
prescribing antibiotics are misinformed. This can be attributed
to the fact that some physicians “do not prescribe via electronic
prescribing systems.” They are therefore “not aware of current
shortages and proposed or expect others to deal with the issues
as they feel it is not their responsibility.” Furthermore, even
among those health-care professionals who may use electronic
subscribing, if the system is not followed as designed, such as
prescribing via free text, they will not be aware that the medicines
they are prescribing are affected by a shortage.
Monitor Patients on Alternatives and Reintroduce
Initial Therapy
In H-CR, H-SP, and H-SR, monitoring of patients after
introducing alternative antibiotic treatment fails owing to non-
supportive information technology (IT) systems. For example, in
H-SP patient “lab data cannot be cross-checked automatically”
and “the system does not allow alerts of clinical issues to pop-up.”
“Lack of time and knowledge” on how to appropriately monitor
patients is present in H-CR and H-SR, whereas in H-CR, there
is a “lack of staff, monitoring Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs), and appropriate IT infrastructure.” In H-BE, sometimes,
monitoring or reintroducing the initial treatment is not always
an option because of “lack of time and data on shortages”
changing on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the “fear of over-
alerting health-care professionals” and making them reluctant to
read emails and check medicine availability also cause additional
monitoring to be avoided.
Hazard Analyses
In H-BE, the highest number of FM (n = 5) per sub-process
was registered. H-BE also reported the highest number of FM
in general (n = 16), and H-SP the lowest (n = 10). The highest
numbers of FM with HSs above 8 were seen in H-CR (n = 12)
and H-GR (n = 11), and the lowest numbers were observed
in H-AT and H-BE (Table 2). This led to the identification of
38 FMC with an HS above 8 in H-CR. In H-CR, FM with the
highest HS (score of 16) were “information on substitute is not
transferred” and “additional patient monitoring not conducted.”
In H-AT, five FMs were removed from the analysis that scored
above 8 following the decision tree assessment, as the HFMEA
teams concluded that there were effective control measures for
these hazards. Fifteen FMCs were removed in H-CR following
the same methodology. FM and FMC that scored below 8 were
mostly included in the analysis in H-AT and H-BE. The highest
number of FMCs was observed in H-CR (n= 46), and the lowest
in H-SP (n = 16). H-CR had the highest cumulative FMC HS
(cumulative score of 404) and H-AT the lowest (cumulative score
of 131). For a list of highly scored FMs across the HFMEA study
hospitals, see Table S1. HFMEA research teams mainly opted for
control-type corrective measures (e.g., n = 22 for H-CR) and
eliminate-type measure (e.g., n= 23 for H-GE and H-SR).
Corrective Actions and Hazard Score
Reduction
Although assigned severity scores of FMdid not statistically differ
before and after proposed corrective actions in H-AT, H-BE,
and H-SP, they differed significantly in H-CR, H-GR, and H-SR
(p < 0.005). Median severity, probability, and HSs before and
after corrective actions with a total range within each hospital
are presented in Table 3. The probability that FM occurred
before and after corrective actions did differ significantly in all
study hospitals (p < 0.005). HSs, based on FM severity and
probability, also significantly differed before and after corrective
measures (p < 0.001). Not only did severity and probability of
FMdiffer significantly within hospitals before and after corrective
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TABLE 2 | Characteristics of hazard analyses between study hospitals.
Characteristics Hospitals Median [IQR]
H-AT H-BE H-CR H-GR H-SP H-SR
Number of sub-processes 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 [5.75–6]
Number of failure modes 11 16 12 13 10 12 12 [10.75–13.75]
Number of failure modes > 8 4 7 12 11 9 10 9.5 [6.25–11.25]
Number of failure modes removed from HFMEA (incl. > 8) 5 4 / 1 2 / 3 [1.25–4.75]
Number of failure modes < 8 but included in HFMEA 2 5 / 1 / 2 2 [1.25–4.25]
Number of failure mode causes 21 18 46 31 16 31 26 [17.50–34.75]
Number of failure mode causes > 8 16 10 38 31 15 26 21 [13.75–32.75]
Number of failure mode causes removed from HFMEA (incl. >8) 6 / 15 2 3 2 3 [2–10.5]
Number of failure mode causes < 8 but included in HFMEA 3 8 3 / / 4 3.5 [3–7]
The highest number of failure modes in a sub-process 3 5 3 3 3 2 3 [2.75–3.5]
The lowest number of failure modes in a sub-process 2 1 1 2 1 2 1.5 [1–2]
The highest score for a failure mode 12 12 16 12 9 9 12 [9–13]
Number of actions CONTROL 15 14 22 6 1 6 10 [4.75–16.75]
Number of actions ELIMINATE / 3 11 23 11 23 11 [7–23]
Number of actions ACCEPT / 2 / / 1 / 1.5 [0.75–4.25]
IQR, interquartile range; SP, sub-process; FM, failure mode; FMC, failure mode causes.
TABLE 3 | Failure mode quantification: severity, probability, and hazard scores before and after corrective actions.
Median severity score
[IQR], (total range)
p-valuea Median probability score
[IQR], (total range)
p-valuea Median hazard score
[IQR], (total range)
p-valuea
Hospitals Before CA After CA Before CA After CA Before CA After CA
H-AT 3 [2.25–3],
(2–3)
3 [2.25–3],
(2–3)
n.a. 3 [2.25–4],
(1–4)
2 [1–2.75],
(1–4)
0.002 8.5 [6.5–9],
(3–12)
6 [3–6],
(2–9)
0.002
H-BE 3 [2.75–3],
(2–4)
3 [2–3],
(1–4)
0.276 3 [1.75–4],
(1–4)
1.5 [1–2.25],
(1–3)
0.001 8 [5.5–9],
(3–12)
4 [3–6],
(2–9)
0.001
H-CR 4 [4–4],
(4–4)
4 [3–4],
(3–4)
0.002 3 [2–4],
(1–4)
2 [1–2],
(1–3)
<0.001 12 [8–16],
(4–16)
6 [4–8],
(3–12)
<0.001
H-GR 3 [3–4],
(2–4)
3 [2.5–4],
(2–4)
<0.001 4 [3–4],
(3–4)
2 [2–2],
(1–2)
<0.001 12 [12–12],
(8–16)
6 [4–8],
(2–8)
<0.001
H-SP 3 [2–3.25],
(2–4)
3 [2–3],
(2–4)
0.317 4 [2.75–4],
(2–4)
2 [1.75–2],
(1–2)
0.001 8 [8–9.75],
(8–12)
4 [4–6],
(3–6)
0.001
H-SR 3 [3–3],
(3–4)
3 [3–3],
(2–3)
0.005 3 [3–3],
(2–4)
1 [1–1],
(1–2)
<0.001 9 [9–9],
(6–12)
3 [3–3],
(2–6)
<0.001
Total 3 [3–4],
(2–4)
3 [3–4],
(1–4)
<0.001 3 [2–4],
(1–4)
2 [1–2],
(1–4)
<0.001 9 [8–12],
(3–16)
4 [3–6],
(2–12)
<0.001
IQR, interquartile range; CA, corrective actions.
ap-value estimated by Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
measures, but they also differed between hospitals (p < 0.005;
Table 4).
In all the study hospitals, the proposed hypothetical corrective
actions recommended by the HFMEA teams led to HS reductions
between 62.5 and 83% (see Table S2). Whereas, H-AT, H-BE, and
H-CR mostly opted for “control” measures, H-GR, H-SP, and
H-SR opted mainly for “eliminate” measures. Providing more
structured communication among health-care professionals and
introducing electronic prescribing would both lead to a 66.6%
reduction in HSs in H-AT of FM related to the approval
and the provision of substitutes. Proactive multi-stakeholder
communication and follow-up on shortages could potentially
reduce HSs by 83.3% in H-BE when looking at FM related to
providing proper alternatives and timely information.
In H-CR, pharmacists more actively participating in the ward
would lead to a 66.6% reduction of hazards. Participation would
also assist empirical antibiotic treatment by providing patient
and antibiotic assessments. Efficient ward stock replenishment
would also reduce HSs by 66.6% in H-BE and H-GR for available
alternatives to reach the patient. In H-SP, providing an IT system
tailored automatically to cross-check patient laboratory data
would result in a 62.5% reduction in HSs of the FM relating
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TABLE 4 | Comparison of the severity, probability, and hazard scores among countries.
Scores Hospitals p-valuea
H-AT H-BE H-CR H-GR H-SP H-SR
Severity Before CA Mean rank 39.25 47.39 112.50 77.09 45.43 60.36 <0.001
Median [IQR] 3 [2.25–3] 3 [2.75–3] 4 [4–4] 3 [3–4] 3 [2–3.25] 3 [3–3]
After CA Mean rank 51.63 55.72 105.89 72.05 51.07 58.88 <0.001
Median [IQR] 3 [2.25–3] 3 [2–3] 4 [3–4] 3 [2.5–4] 3 [2–3] 3 [3–3]
Probability Before CA Mean rank 73.13 56.83 61.99 94.24 89.96 59.86 0.001
Median [IQR] 3 [2.25–4] 3 [1.75–4] 3 [2–4] 4 [3–4] 4 [2.75–4] 3 [3–3]
After CA Mean rank 75.69 70.08 79.50 85.93 78.89 42.14 <0.001
Median [IQR] 2 [1–2.75] 1.5 [1–2.25] 2 [1–2] 2 [2–2] 2 [1.75–2] 1 [1–1]
Hazard Before CA Mean rank 51.16 39.17 83.22 101.36 55.89 65.91 <0.001
Median [IQR] 8.5 [6.5–9] 8 [5.5–9] 12 [8–16] 12 [12–12] 8 [8–9.75] 9 [9–9]
After CA Mean rank 66.75 55.56 96.14 88.48 68.64 37.83 <0.001
Median [IQR] 6 [3–6] 4 [3–6] 6 [4–8] 6 [4–8] 4 [4–6] 3 [3–3]
CA, corrective action.
ap-value estimated using Kruskal–Wallis test to investigate the difference in dependent variables among countries.
to failure of monitoring patients on a substitute. In H-SR,
standard operating procedures for checking emerging drug–drug
interactions after having introduced a substitute, although not in
general practice, would reduce HSs by 77.7%.
In H-AT, some corrective actions bore little to no effect onHSs
(see Table S3) such as aiming at redistributing tasks of health-
care professionals in order to have timely and proper entry of
information on available antibiotics into the medicine’s ordering
system. Moreover, additional patient monitoring after antibiotic
substitution in H-BE may not be facilitated by corrective
actions such as outsourcing monitoring services or reminding
health-care professionals to monitor patients as they show no
HS reduction.
DISCUSSION
Information Sharing on Antibiotics Affected
by Shortages and Their Substitutes
The HFMEA identified 74 FMs in six study hospitals. Fifty-three
of these scored 8 or above, representing failures of, in DeRosier’s
words, “sufficient likelihood to warrant that it be controlled”
(41). HFMEA teams took into consideration these failures, which
occurred due to lack of timely information on antimicrobial
shortages (HS 12 and H-BE) or improper assessment of the
information received (HS 9 and H-AT). Because the substitute
might not be available to be prescribed/ordered when using the
hospital’s IT system, such information should be synchronized
with availability and be easily accessible via databases instead of
time-consuming processes via two-way telephone conversations
or email contact. Not knowing the available substitute may
jeopardize and delay patient treatment and consequently
undermine health outcomes (15, 42, 43).
Five out of the six hospitals report that being able to
acquire valid information on shortage duration and availability
of alternatives in the initial step. According to Boechenek et al.
(44) accessing such information is ultimately determined by the
country in which the shortage occurs. In Austria, Belgium, Spain,
and Greece, their respective national agencies for medicines
are responsible for providing publicly available databases on
shortages, whereas in Croatia and Serbia, this falls under the
responsibility of the National Health Insurance Fund. However,
considering the FMs emerging from this study, it seems that
the data provided via these databases in H-AT, H-BE, and H-
SP are neither up-to-date nor easily accessible to health-care
professionals to readily share information. Reporting itself is
not mandatory; thereby, if there is information at all, it is
often not comprehensive and does not meet the purpose of
finding an alternative. Furthermore, failing to share/transfer the
required information on alternatives through internal hospital
information systems is evident (FM 9 in H-AT, H-GR, and H-
SP but 16 in H-CR), which needs to be better addressed in the
future. As indicated, information sharing is essential in potential
and ongoing shortages as it can provide appropriate antibiotic
substitutions to meet time-sensitive situations. Moreover,
established guidelines help restrict antimicrobial use in shortages
to those patients who are ranked highest by priority (10). Clear
decision-making processes that include communication between
hospital pharmacies and DTCs may therefore assist through
prioritizing patients and implementing substitution protocols
(45). Health-care professionals should also be educated on how
to use these protocols and how to prioritize patients when
needed (3).
A lack of timely and direct communication represents one
of the main barriers in managing antibiotic shortages (4, 46).
Arising from the features of IT facilities coupled with a lack
of human resources in conjunction with the high workload
described, the FMs are linked to the absence of proper channels
of communication scored above 9 in H-BE, H-GR, and H-SP.
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Moreover, in H-BE, where the FM scored 9, a delay in
transferring data on antibiotic shortages led to unadjusted stock
levels. To combat against these issues, it is essential to disseminate
information on shortages successfully. Therefore, a network
of decision-making clinicians and other stakeholders within a
respective health-care setting must be established (10). Notifying
health-care professionals should be performed prior to the actual
medicine request submitted to the pharmacy when the antibiotics
in question are only available in limited quantities or otherwise
completely unavailable (10). Furthermore, any notification on
shortages should also comprise additional data on substitutes,
including their indication for use, and should be readily available
at the point of care. These notifications must be compiled as such
so that health-care professionals need not perform any additional
literature research when trying to decide on alternatives (10, 17).
The decision-making process may also be based on checklists
to facilitate consistency in substitution, where data regarding
a medicine’s dosage, administration particularities, and any
potential look-alike or sound-alike risks are to be clearly
stated (16).
Appropriateness Assessment for Antibiotic
Substitution
Multidisciplinary committees play a vital role in facilitating
decisions on antibiotics within a health-care facility (4). DTCs
in both H-AT and H-BE oversee the process of substitution,
thereby allowing for a multidisciplinary patient assessment
with particulars to given cases to be accounted for. As
presented in H-BE, an antimicrobial stewardship subcommittee
thoroughly elaborates on aspects of antimicrobial substitution
and accounts for potential patient groups and diseases.
Antimicrobial stewardship programs have also been cited as
a way to disseminate information on substitution in order to
provide better-coordinated care and increase patient safety (10,
47).
Information assessment on a substitute in health-care settings
did not appear to follow a standardized manner in our
study, which may lead to potential misinterpretation of the
information on administration patterns of alternatives. To
illustrate this, in H-SR and H-CR, a suitable antimicrobial
alternative is primarily based on a structured assessment of
the microbiology strain’s characteristics and the alternative
spectrum of activity available. However, insufficient access
to information on the availability of suitable substitutes
aggravates existing FMs of not having a review of alternative
antibacterial spectra in H-SR (FM 9) or adverse events profile in
H-CR (FM 12).
“Inter-professional and interpersonal miscommunication”
on roles may create health-care professionals’ perception that
mitigation of shortages is not in their scope of activities causing
3/11 FMs in H-AT and 3/13 FMs in H-GR. When deciding
on substitutes in H-GR, difficulties in accessing patient data
and by an “absence of health-care professionals’ willingness to
provide additional information” both form obstacles to some of
the hospital pharmacists. If an alternative’s reconstitution and
administration pattern are not fully entered into the system, it
represents another challenge to less experienced unsupervised
personnel (H-SP).
Underlined by Griffith et al. (10), pharmacists dedicated to
antibiotic stewardship must carry out a medicine review in order
to find the most suitable antimicrobials in case no suggestions via
guidelines are available (10). Moreover, this may be conducted
by a team able to assess available antibiograms for a respective
health-care setting or determine empiric antibiotics (48).
Access to and Validation of Patient
Medical Records
Patient-record validation represents one of the substitution
sub-processes in all six study hospitals. Nonetheless, the
HFMEA depicted numerous FMCs within this sub-process,
demonstrating an absence of clear guidelines on validation as
part of the substitution. FMs emerging from not fully validated
patient medical records prior to a substitution demonstrate the
need to account for the clinical status of a patient (FM > 8 in
H-GR, H-CR, and H-SR). The majority of failures come directly
or indirectly from the “absence of electronic prescribing,” which
itself is a major barrier in the efficient assessment of patient
data and safe substitution practices. Computerized physician
order entry (CPOE) does reduce errors and makes prescribing
a safer process, as confirmed by the HFMEA (49). Decisions on
alternatives in H-SP distinctly noted the need for providing more
thorough laboratory hepatic and renal parameters automatically
screened for in medical records during the decision process on
alternatives, as well as for continuous monitoring throughout the
patient’s treatment.
Staff Scarcity and Time Constraints in
Antibiotic Substitution
“Lack of time” proved to be an FMC in more than half of the sub-
processes of antibiotic substitution in H-AT, H-CR, H-GR, H-SP,
and H-SR, leading to 5/11 FMs (45%), 2/12 FMs (17%), 5/13
FMs (38%), 4/10 FMs (40%), and 6/12 FMs (50%), respectively.
Managing shortages is often seen as solely the task of a hospital
pharmacist, confirmed by studies conducted in Belgium and
the EAHP where hospital pharmacists are reported to spend a
significant time mitigating shortages (2, 44).
Time is a key factor in prescribing medicine. Griffith et al.
note that any delays in treatment and care can cascade into
higher safety risks at each subsequent stage of antimicrobial
treatment (42). Therefore, when the prescriber is unfamiliar with
a substitute due to time constraints, it bears a negative influence
on the subsequent steps within treatment, which may result in
being less aware or a proper alternative’s dosage requirements and
contraindications for use (45). Clinicians therefore need to be
highly trained to provide effective treatment when dealing with
priority group patients to provide the right medicine promptly
to avoid unnecessary delays (10). To illustrate, for those patients
with nosocomial infections (e.g., pneumonia, blood stream
infection, and sepsis), a timely provided substitute is essential
as it lowers risks of mortality (42, 50–58). Moreover, optimal
antimicrobial use is critical owing to an increasing number of
Frontiers in Medicine | www.frontiersin.org 9 May 2020 | Volume 7 | Article 157
Miljkovic´ et al. HFMEA of European Medicine Shortages
multiresistant strains, which only respond to a narrow range of
antibiotics (42).
Apart from time as a distinct issue, “scarcity of hospital
pharmacy staff” is pronounced in H-SR and H-CR,
accounting for 4/12 (33%) of the FMs as they have a lower
staff number. These failures are in line with the WHO’s
report predicting the ongoing global shortage of health-care
professionals to reach 18 million professionals worldwide
by 2030 (59). As such, scarcity is also an issue in hospitals
employing a larger staff as well (H-AT, H-GR, and H-SP).
Partially owing to a “lack of time” and “task prioritization,”
health-care professionals do not view “the assessment of
antibiotic alternative’s appropriateness” as a priority and
part of “everyday practice” (H-GR, H-SP, H-CR, and H-SR).
Consequently, proper patient clinical status assessments and
patient safety could be jeopardized when trying to find a
suitable alternative. Inappropriate medicine management
also further adds to risk by limiting the ability of health-care
professionals to assess the individual patient’s needs in a
shortage (2).
When staff or time is short, it limits the ability of health-
care professionals to find an appropriate alternative. Therefore,
alternatives should be established in advance for critical
medicines used in the ER and other departments because they
are most often affected by shortages (2, 7, 45, 60). When
substituting a medicine, it is necessary to have experienced
hospital pharmacists perform accurate calculations (4).
Monitoring and Communication With a
Patient Throughout Antibiotic Shortages
In the literature, the focus has shifted from barely reporting and
listing shortages to characterizing their impact on patient safety
and the harm caused. The literature also proposes a variety of
management “strategies,” which are highly needed, as confirmed
by findings from the present research (47, 61). Gundlapalli et al.
(15) highlight the need for newmodalities of managing shortages
to be necessary because practitioners are now able to gather
data on shortages more quickly than previously (15). However,
disseminating data on the clinical impact where insufficient
antibiotics substantially affect treatment is still missing (15).
Substitution therefore depends on the aggregated data based
on the extent of shortages as well as their impact on clinical
practice and potential solutions of dealing with the shortage
(10, 15).
The HFMEA bears out the need for more effective strategies to
overcome shortages through data sharing and monitoring. When
an alternative antibiotic is introduced, several research HFMEA
study teams had highly scored FMs related to the absence of
patient monitoring (H-SP-9, H-SR-9, and H-CR-16, but 12 under
partially conducted monitoring). Insufficient checking of the
patient’s medical records in H-GR (HS = 12) and H-SP (HS =
9) were also found.
When introduced, the patient must be additionally monitored
as the substitute might not be the best possible therapeutic
solution (62). Patient monitoring of alternatives was shown
in the HFMEA to be regularly conducted in H-BE (allowing
for time). Whereas, in H-CR, H-SP, and H-SR, interlinked
FMCs including a lack of staff, IT support, and available
laboratory software for data to be cross-checked (H-SP) hindered
this type of monitoring. Antimicrobial stewardship programs,
facilitated by electronically led medical records, are also needed
to support continuous, effective monitoring and evaluation of
patient health outcomes after substitution takes place in order to
provide corrective measures in time if needed (63). Corrective
actions are avoidable if patients stay under supervision during
substitution, allowing follow-up on the effectiveness of the new
therapeutic regime.
The FMC “insufficient competency in communication among
health-care professionals” scored 8 in H-CR, presenting a barrier
in communicating/discussing with patients on antimicrobial
shortages. Patients themselves were also found to be limited
in their willingness to be informed on therapies. Moreover,
physicians/pharmacists did not communicate effectively to the
patient when deciding on a substitute. This comes in stark
contrast to the recommendation that patients have to be
informed on potential risks emerging from potentially less
efficient or more toxic provided alternatives, at least when the
clinical situation allows communication with the patient (64).
Health-Care Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis-Team Corrective Measures for
Reducing Hazard Scores
The HFMEA teams generally opted for initiating corrective
actions in their hospitals. These imply the implementation of
training courses and the sensitization of health-care professionals
to the management of antibiotic shortages, introducing internal
SOPs and improving communication. Such changes would
hypothetically reduce HSs by more than 60%. Except for H-SP,
all study hospitals had no specific shortage-management task
force group in place. Moreover, there were no existing internal
guidelines providing strategies on how to manage shortages in all
hospitals; this was under development in H-BE.
The H-AT team claimed that more structured communication
among health-care professionals would reduce scores by 66%.
It was also reported that a more proactive communication on a
multi-stakeholder platform would lower HSs by 83%, whereas
the more prominent role of ward pharmacists on shortages in
H-CR would also cut scores by 66%. In H-SP, corrective actions
also included the proposal of an advanced IT supported program
for cross-checking laboratory data for all patients monitored
after substitution. Doing so would likely reduce HSs by 63%.
According to Erin Fox of the US Drug Information Center from
the University of Utah, it is necessary to have a process in
place defining an alternative’s approval and ethical considerations
for a substitute’s allocation that has already been established
prior to a shortage occurring. Moreover, this entails information
on how to gather sufficient data on a shortage, to purchase
alternatives, to assess storage conditions, to apply procedures for
preparing and dispensing the medicine, to decide whether to
reallocate substitutes, to implement IT changes, and to actively
communicate all of these parameters (4).
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Study Limitations and Potential
Applying the HFMEA in a health-care setting bears a
certain subjectivity, as seen in the selection of particular
FMs and the manner in which the HFMEA teams use their
subjective perception to appoint scores. Nonetheless, having
a multidisciplinary team alleviates the bias in risk assessment
aiming at assuring an objective perception of the processes,
sub-processes, FMs, and failure causes through a consensus of
team members. Additionally, all assessments and meetings were
supervised by one member of the research team (NM; lead) to
reduce variability in interpretation. Although the HFMEA results
from one hospital to another may not easily be extrapolated to
other settings, given the particularities of each health-care setting,
this study highlighted that the HFMEA in medicine shortages
provided a number of similarities in detected FMs and causes.
Moreover, the process used in each hospital was generalizable
in terms of defined overarching FMs and patterns emerging
from this risk assessment, which can assist in preventing
the aforementioned risks from occurring in other health-care
settings. It must be distinctly noted that all hospitals where
the HFMEA took place are university-teaching hospitals, which
might bear on how antimicrobial shortages are managed, as
compared with non-teaching hospitals. It is generally cited that
teaching hospitals are more efficient and have better quality
of care than non-teaching (65). As such, their teaching status
may account for having health-care professionals possessing
greater experience in treating certain conditions, which may
account for better patient outcomes (66). However, other factors
such organizational culture, adopting health technologies in
hospitals, and the health-care staff available may all result in
better health-care provided (67). For this reason, it is difficult
to distinguish better patient satisfaction and health outcomes
in terms of treatment appropriateness and effectiveness when
it is a teaching institution (68, 69). Another limitation of the
study was not having a patient representative involved in the
assessments, meaning that patients’ perceptions on antibiotic
substitution stemming from shortages could not be considered.
In addition, considering that only hypothetical corrective actions
emerging from this HFMEA have here been analyzed and
displayed in each study hospital, the real HS reduction and actual
impact on everyday practice needs to be evaluated in subsequent
prospective risk assessment analyses in each respective hospital
in order to fully assess their impact on risk reduction. In
the meantime, we believe that this analysis on the basis of a
robust methodology will be helpful to all European hospitals to
aid them in reducing the impact of antimicrobial shortages in
the future.
CONCLUSION
Through a prospective risk assessment of antibiotic substitution
following shortages, a variety of corrective actions were
identified theoretically proven to decrease the risks. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first HFMEA
study conducted specifically on antimicrobial substitution
processes among European hospitals. Our study shows an
absence of a structured approach in addressing all risks
emerging from antibiotic substitutions, including access and
provision of information needed to deliver an alternative
treatment in a timely manner, among European hospitals.
The data obtained via HFMEA confirm that communication
plays a crucial role in successfully mitigating risk during
substitution following shortages. Suggestions made by the
HFMEA teams are mainly oriented toward improving internal
and external communication via IT systems and through the
thorough revision of existing mitigating procedures. Additional
suggestions include recommending the introduction of new
protocols for antibiotic substitution when shortages arise, as
there are appears to be no existing internal guidelines in place
for each study hospital. A similar situation is likely to exist
in an appreciable number of other European hospitals. These
guidelines should clearly describe steps on how to promptly
react to antibiotic or any other medicine shortages, emphasizing
the preparedness of health-care professionals and possible
preventable actions that could be carried out to help avoid
patient harm. The scarcity of data on the availability of antibiotics
hinders health-care professional’s efforts to conduct timely
assessment of potential alternatives to address current patient
needs. Nevertheless, as shown throughout the analysis, this study
does indicate that health-care professionals are managing to
use existing IT and human resources, despite all obstacles, to
secure optimal antimicrobial treatment for patients and control
risks. This can be built on in the future to further improve
patient care.
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